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Provision is made in UCC section 6-i io for the protection of bona
fide purchasers of the goods who have no notice of the seller's failure
to comply with the bulk sales statute. Such purchasers take free of
any defect in title while purchasers with notice of the transferor's
noncompliance take subject to the defect in title.39
The final section in the UCC bulk sales article concerns the statute
of limitations on actions by creditors claiming noncompliance with the
article. The comments state that the six months' limitation on actions
and levies is appropriate because of the unusual obligations the statute
imposes on buyers of property in bulk.40 If the transfer has been con-
cealed, however, actions may be brought or levies made within six
months after discovery of the concealment.
41
At first glance the Virginia Code appears to embody the same six
months statute of limitations.42 Virginia Code section 55-85 states that
after six months have passed, "no suit or action shall be brought to
have declared void.., any sale or purchase" which is claimed to be a
bulk sale. However, Virginia Code section 55-86 provides that if the
sale has been made for value and in good faith, although the provisions
of the act have not been complied with, and no action has been begun
within twelve months of the sale, then no action to declare -the transfer
void shall be brought. Thus it appears that the Virginia Code has some-
what conflicting statutes of limitation, and it is submitted that section
55-86 is unnecessary and should be repealed, regardless of the adoption
in Virginia of the UCC.
On balance, Article 6 of the UCC offers Virginia a well-written
bulk sales statute and the advantages of uniformity with other states in
this area of commercial law.
WVILUAm H. CLARK, JR.
CONDITIONAL SALES AND ARTICLE 9
The conditional sale is one of several common law and statutory
security devices merged into what is called a security interest under
the secured transactions article of the Uniform Commercial Code. Full
3"Under UCG § 6-io8 (4) the sanction at auction sales is placed on the auction-
eer, not the buyers.
4OUCC § 6-11, Comment, Point 1.
"UCC § 6-11.
"Va. Code Ann. § 55-84 (Repl. Vol. 1959). This section further provides that
both seller and purchaser shall preserve the inventory, list and affidavit required
by § 55-83 for six months. See Barker v. Stant, 3 F.d 918 (4th Cir. 1925), which
applies the Virginia six months statute of limitations.
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protection for the seller and the buyer in the traditional conditional
sale is as effectively provided by the UCC as under Virginia law. How-
ever, there are some basic differences in the method and philosophy
of the UCG and Virginia law. Some differences are minimal, but
others are substantial and merit consideration and explanation.
The philosophy of Article 9, and the principal test used in de-
termining whether a particular transaction comes under the article, is
that of giving effect to the intentions of the parties as shown by their
actions. The important question is: Did the parties intend that the
transaction should create a security interest? If they did, mutual
consent to the creation of the security interest being established, the
sanctions and protections of the UCG become effective. The exact
location of the title to goods, heretofore an important consider-
ation in determining the type of secured transaction is no longer of
significance. It had been controlling in determining whether the trans-
action constituted a conditional sale, i.e., retained title, as distin-
guished from a chattel mortgage, transferred title.1 The significant
feature under the UCG is that the parties intended to create a security
interest, agreed to do so, and have complied with the UCC provi-
sions. It is indicative of the change in approach of the UCC that under
Virginia law, conditional sales were not always favored by the courts,
2
while the UCC looks upon security interests as both necessary and
desirable in a modem business world.
The purpose of the Virginia statute on conditional sales, sec-
tion 55-88 of the Code of 1950,3 is to protect the seller of goods allow-
ing him to retain title to the goods until they are paid for. The
13 M.J., Chattel Mortgages and Conditional Sales, § 2.
2-Mullins v. Sutherland, 131 Va. 547, 109 S.E. 420 (1921).
-1Va. Code Ann. § 55-88 (Repl. Vol. 1959) reads as follows:
Every sale or contract for sale of goods and chattels, wherein the title there-
to or a lien thereon is reserved until the same be paid for, in whole or in
part, or the transfer of title is made to depend on any condition, when
possession is delivered to the vendee, shall, in respect to such reservation
and condition, be void as to creditors of the vendee, who acquire a lien
upon the goods and as to purchasers from the vendee, for value without
notice, unless such sale or contract be evidenced by writing, signed by the
vendor and the vendee, setting forth the date thereof, the amount due, when
and how payable, a brief description of the goods and chattels, and the
terms of the reservation or condition; and unless such writing is filed
with the clerk by whom deeds are admitted to record, as provided by law,
of the county or corporation in which such goods and chattels may be;
provided, that if such filing be done within five days from the delivery of
the goods and chattels to the vendee, it shall be as valid as to creditors and
purchasers as if such filing had been done on the day of such delivery of
the goods and chattels.
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"goods and chattels" covered are "visible, tangible and movable"
personal property.4 Property such as a boiler in a plantA machinery,
sprinkler system 6 or other movable machinery, even though bolted to
the floor, and durable goods, are subject to such a retention of title
agreement. Choses in action are not goods or chattels under Virginia
law.7 The conditional sales device is available irrespective of the use
to which the goods and chattels are to be put. The UCC, however,
distinguishes the different types of goods and chattels according to
their use. These distinctions are important and fundamental. Goods
are classified as (i) consumer goods,s if they are used or bought for
use primarily for personal, family or household purposes, and (2)
equipment,9 if they are used or bought for use primarily in business
(including farming or a profession). These classes of goods are mu-
tually ,exclusive. In any single transaction, a chattel is either consumer
goods or equipment, but it cannot be both. In borderline cases, where
a chattel might be considered either consumer goods or equipment,
the principal use to which the property is to be put is determinative.
These two classifications are especially important in considering the
differences between the Virginia law and the UCC, for consumer
goods and equipment generally constitute the goods and chattels
subject to the Virginia conditional sales statute.
Other terminology under the UCC is of importance. The Virginia
Code defines the seller of goods under a conditional sales contract
as the conditional vendor and the buyer as the conditional vendee.10
The UCC redefines these parties. The seller is the secured party; the
buyer is the debtor." The conditional sales contract is now called
the security agreement.' 2 In essence a conditional sale agreement is
covered by the special term, "purchase money security interest," used
throughout Article 9.
"A security interest is a purchase money security interest to the
extent that it is taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to
secure all or part of its price."' 3 In short, the seller of goods has a
'Monarch Laundry v. Westbrook, iog Va. 382, 385, 63 S.E. 1070, 107, (1909),
quoting Kirkland, Chase & Co. v. Brune, 72 Va. (1 Gratt.) 126, 131 (1878).
5lbid.
OHolt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914).
Tirst Nat. Bank v. Holland, 99 Va. 495, 39 S.E. 126 (0O).
sUCC § 9-109(1).
9UCC § 9"109(2).
'OVa. Code Ann. § 55-88 (Rep1. Vol. 1959).
"UCC § 9-105(1)(d).
2UCC § 9 -1o5 (h).
'3UCC § 9-107(a).
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purchase money security interest if he retains a security interest in the
goods. There are special rules applicable to the "purchase money
security interest" which differ in some respects from other interests
created under Article 9. It is a favored security interest under the
UCC.14
A brief example will summarize the basic differences in termin-
ology which should be borne in mind in considering the effect of the
UCC on the traditional conditional sales contract. Under the Vir-
ginia law, a retail dealer selling a refrigerator executes a conditional
sales contract retaining title in himself as the conditional vendor as
against the conditional vendee; under the UCC the seller creates
a purchase money security interest in consumer goods (possibly
equipment) in which he is the secured party and the buyer becomes
the debtor.
Bearing in mind these fundamental distinctions in terminology,
the differences between Virginia's law of conditional sales and the
UCC in regards to the rights between the parties, rights as against
third parties, recordation and filing, and default, can be more easily
understood.
RIGHTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
There is little difference between the Virginia law and the UCC
in regulating the rights between the parties. Virginia has no statutory
coverage, and the case law indicates "their rights and liabilities de-
pend upon the intention of the parties as expressed in the contract by
which they have bound themselves."' 5 The UCC gives the same au-
thority to the parties, subject only to the limitations of state retail
installment acts.16 Virginia statutes are thus applicable here, as before.
Failure to comply with the Virginia regulatory statutes has whatever
effect may be specified in the particular statute, but no more.17 There
is some Virginia case law on the enforcibility of the rights between
the parties. The rulings of these cases are still applicable under the
UCC. It has been held: that the seller can take out insurance and
add the premium to the buyer's debt;' 8 that the risk of loss in case
of fire or other destruction is on the buyer;' 9 and that the court will
1 UCC § 9-312.
'Universal Credit Co. v. Taylor, 164 Va. 624, 628, i8o S.E. 277, 279 (1935).
"UCC § 9-2o; Va. Code Ann. § 46.1-545 (Repl. Vol. 1958), applying only to
motor vehicles.
17UCC § 9-203(2).
'1Fisch v. Steingold, 79 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1935).
"Exposition Arcade Corp. v. Lit. Bros., 113 Va. 574, 75 S.E. 117 (1912).
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not enforce an illegal agreement. 20 Virginia law requires conditional
sales contracts to be in ten-point type, a requirement that is con-
tinued under the UCC.21
The UCC specifically states that unless the secured party has pos-
session, the security agreement must be set forth in a writing that de-
scribes the collateral and is signed by the debtor.2 2 these requirements
are in the nature of a statute of frauds and the security interest is not
enforceable between the parties unless complied with.23 The Virginia
statute requires the agreement to be in writing and signed by both
vendor and vendee.24 The failure of the vendor to sign resulted in the
nonenforcement of a contract in the recent federal case of In re
A dkins.
2 5
Under the Virginia statute the security interest is effective between
the parties when it is written, while the UCC requires the "attach-
ment" to establish a valid security interest.2 6 Ordinarily there will be
no problem here since under the UCC attachment simply means: (i)
There must be an agreement that the security interest attach; (2) the
secured party must have given value; and (3) the debtor must have an
interest in the collateral.2 7
The UCC provides a new technique whereby the debtor may obtain
clarification of his liabilities. The debtor may prepare and sign a
statement setting forth his understanding of the aggregate of the
amount of the unpaid debt and a list of the collateral securing the
debt and ask the secured party to approve or correct the statement.
The secured party must comply with the request within two weeks
and is liable for any loss the debtor may suffer from noncompliance.
28
It will be noted that these requirements, with the exception of
the need for the vendor's signature are somewhat more exacting than
those under prior Virginia law, but the terms and provisions of the
purchase money security interest remain within the discretion of the
parties, subject only to the present Virginia limitations on retail
installment sales of motor vehicles.
-'Levy v. Davis, 115 Va. 814, 8o S.E. 791 (1914).
"'Va. Code Ann. § 11-4 (Repl. Vol. 1956); Garrett v. International Motor Truck
Agency, 151 Va. 795, 145 S.E. 252 (1928); UCC §§ 9-201, 9-203(2).
'UCC § 9-208(1).
'UCC § 9-203. Comment, Point 5 indicates that unless the secured party is
in possession of the collateral, his interest is not enforceable even against the debtor
and cannot be made so on any theory of equitable mortgage or the like.
'Va. Code Ann. § 55-88 (Repl. Vol. 1959).
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RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES AND PRIoRrriEs
Secured Creditor v. Bona Fide Purchaser from the Debtor
In Virginia, the conditional vendor must record his conditional
sales contract if he desires complete protection, for, a bona fide pur-
chaser of second-hand goods from the vendee will prevail over a
conditional vendor who has not recorded the contract.29 This require-
ment is in effect regardless of the nature of the goods. The Virginia
statute provides a five-day grace period,30 which affords protection to
the seller who records his contract within five days from delivery of
the goods to the vendee.31
Under the UCC whether or not recording is necessary depends on
the nature of the goods, i.e., whether they are equipment or con-
sumer goods. If the goods are equipment, a financing statement must
be filed to perfect the security interest.32 However, if the goods are
consumer goods the purchase money security interest is said to be
perfected at the time it attaches; 33 the three requirements for attach-
ment previously discussed being all that is required. The concept of
"perfection" or "to perfect" is used to describe a security interest
which cannot be defeated in insolvency proceedings. 34 Thus, the seller
has a security interest superior to those of a trustee in bankruptcy or
another later secured creditor, as regards consumer goods, as defined
in the UCC. However, if the secured party desires protection against
another bona fide purchaser of consumer goods from the first buyer,
that is one who buys for value and for his own personal, farming or
household use, he must file a financing statement.3 5 If he fails to do
so the bona fide purchaser takes free of the security interest. But
having filed a financing statement, even though this is not required
by the UCC, the secured party will be protected as fully as the seller
is protected under the Virginia conditional sales statute.3 6
The problem of a purchase by the bona fide purchaser from the
debtor, discussed above, will most often arise when the debtor tries
to sell his chattel secondhand. Ordinarily, the seller can trust the
buyer, but if he has suspicions he may protect himself by filing the
- Va. Code Ann. § 55-88 (Repl. Vol. 1959)
wlbid.
mNorfolk Stationery Co. v. Royster Inv. Corp., 23 F.2d 586 (4th Cir. 1928).
'UCC § 9-302(l).
3UCC § 9-302(1) (d).
1'UCC § 9-302.
• UCC § 9-307(2).
30Ibid.
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financing statement. When the chattel is equipment, as where a doctor
buys a refrigerator for his office, the secured party must file a financing
statement to perfect his interest, but having done so he will be fully
protected, since a person buying a refrigerator from the doctor is not
by definition, buying "in the ordinary course of business."37
While the UCC follows the well known Boice v. Finance & Guar-
anty Corp. rule,38 this rule has no application where a person other
than a dealer sells goods, subject to a security interest, to a bona fide
purchaser. The conditional vendor in Virginia who records a condi-
tional sale prevails over a purchaser from the conditional vendee. In
Rudolph v. Farmer's Supply Co., 39 the Virginia Court of Appeals up-
held the rights of a conditional vendor who sold a car to a conditional
vendee, who sold it to a second-hand dealer who in turn sold it to
a bona fide purchaser. The court distinguished the Boice line of cases
in which a bona fide purchaser of a new car from an auto dealer
prevailed over the financing agency, which was financing the dealer
and which had a validly recorded conditional sale. The court said:
"There is nothing in [the statute] to indicate that the General
Assembly, when it gave the lien which that section affords,
intended to place upon the vendor the duty of following the
subsequent course of the chattel sold by him, and, failing in this
duty, incur the penalty of losing his lien in the event that in
the ultimate such chattel without his knowledge became a part
of a shifting stock, and was sold to an innocent purchaser. It
would be unreasonable to place such an interpretation on the
statute."4
0
Secured Party v. Other Secured Parties
Under the present Virginia statutes, a conditional sales contract
is "void as to creditors of the vendee, who acquire a lien upon the
goods and as to purchasers from the vendee, for value without notice,"
unless the contract is recorded.
41
Under this statute as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Appeals,
a secured party is a purchaser for value and thus must be without
notice of the rights of a conditional vendor.42 Thus, if a conditional
vendee executes a chattel mortgage on the secured goods, in return
UCC § 9-307(t).
3'127 Va. 563, 1o2 S.E. 591, 1o A.L.R. 654 (1920).
1131 Va. 305, io8 S.E. 638 (1921).
40131 Va. at 314.
41Va. Code Ann. § 55-88 (Repl. Vol. 1959).
'1Klingstein v. Vaughan, 149 Va. 147, 140 S.E. 275 (1927); Arbuckle Bros. v.
Gates, 95 Va. 8o2, 30 S.E. 496 (1898).
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for a loan of money, the chattel mortgagee is treated as a purchaser
and must have no knowledge of the conditional vendor's rights. If
he has no knowledge and records his chattel mortgage before the
conditional vendor, and after the five day grace period has elapsed, he
will prevail.
The UCC places the secured party in an independent status. 43
He is neither a lien creditor nor a purchaser. Although there is no
definite statement in the UCC, the secured party would seem to be
required to be without notice.44 The UCC provides that a purchase
money security interest in goods has priority over a conflicting security
interest in the same goods, if the purchase money security interest is
perfected at the time the debtor receives possession or within ten days
thereafter.4 5 Thus, the secured party prevails over the lender of money,
formerly called a chattel mortgagee, if he perfects his security interest
when the debtor receives possession of the collateral or within ten days
thereafter.40
The security interest in consumer goods, having been perfected at
the time of its attachment, is valid as against other secured parties,
even though no financing statement has been filed.47 The filing of a
financing statement to protect the secured party is only necessary to
protect him against a bona fide purchaser (buyer) from the debtor. If
however, the goods are classified as equipment, the financing state-
ment is necessary for protection against other secured parties, such
as a chattel mortgagee. 4s
A brief example will suffice to sum up the rights of the purchase
money secured party (seller of goods) as against another secured
party (lender of money who takes a chattel mortgage or other securi-
ty instrument). Assume that on January i, the debtor, a doctor, pur-
chases a refrigerator (equipment) for his office. The debtor uses the
refrigerator to obtain a loan on January 9, and the secured money
lender records his financing statement. If the seller records his financ-
ing statement on the same day, even though after the money lender,
'3UCC § 9-1o 5 (l)(i).
'"UCC § 9-312(4)(5)(a). See Comment, example 2, which indicates that the
lender is not barred if he knows of the other interest at the time he perfects his
own. It follows that it is not proper for him to have knowledge of the seller's interest
before he advances money. See also Spivack, Secured Transactions iio (Joint Com-
mittee on Continuing Legal Education of the American Law Institute and the
American Bar Association 1962).
4 UCC § 9-312(4).
4OUCC § 9-312(5)(a).
'UCC § 9-3 02(1)(d).
'3UCC § 9-302(1).
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he will prevail. If however, the ten day period elapses, the lender,
having perfected his security interest before the seller of the goods, will
prevail.
Secured Party v. Lien Creditors
Because under the UCC the security interest in consumer goods is
perfected when it attaches, the secured party is fully protected as
against a lien creditor.4 9 When the goods are classified as equipment,
however, the secured party must file a financing statement in order to
perfect his security interest against lien creditors.50 Until the condi-
tional sales contract has been recorded the Virginia statute provides
that it is not valid as against lien creditors, regardless of the nature
of the goods. 51 However, in Virginia the seller has a five day grace
period in which to record his contract.52 Under the UCC there is a ten
day grace period.
53
Under the UCC a lien creditor means "a creditor who has acquired
a lien on the property involved by attachment, levy or -the like, and
includes an assignee for benefit of creditors from the time of as-
signment, and a trustee in bankruptcy from the date of the filing of
the petition or a receiver in equity from the time of appointment."
5 4
This is a restrictive definition and only those parties who fall within
its terms are entitled to the status of a lien creditor. This definition is
similar to that previously used in Virginia with one significant ex-
ception. Whereas the assignee for the benefit of creditors has been
treated as a purchaser for value in Virginia,55 he is defined as a lien
creditor under the UCC56 This change of status, however, has little
substantive effect because of another important change made by
the UCC. Under the Virginia statute, the lien creditor may know of
the conditional vendor's unrecorded contract, and still be protected
if his lien attaches before the conditional vendor records his docu-
ment.57 The UCC expressly provides that the lien creditor will take
priority only if he does not have notice of the earlier security interest
4UCC § 9-3o2(,)(d).
WUCC § 9-302(1).




"Corbett v. Riddle, 209 Fed. 811 (4th Cir. 1913).
5'UCC § 9-301(3).
7Va. Code Ann. § 55-88 (Repl. Vol. 1959). See Guerrant v. Anderson, 25 Va.
(4 Rand.) 208 (1826). There have been no recent cases on this, but a careful read-
ing of the statute indicates that this is true.
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in the goods.58 This change in the knowledge provision thus negates
the effect of the change in status of the assignee for creditors.
Virginia cases indicate that the notice required to bar a purchaser
from asserting his rights in goods, places a strong burden of proof on
the party seeking to assert rights against the purchaser from the ven-
dee.r9 If the seller who has failed to record his retention of the title is
to prevail over the sub-purchaser the "proof must be such as to affect
the conscience of the purchaser and must be so strong and clear as to
fix upon him the imputation of mala fides"60 It would seem that the
lien creditor, who under the UCC must be without actual notice of an
unrecorded security interest in equipment, will benefit from this
stringent burden of proof developed under earlier Virginia law.
These problems will not be too troublesome in normal retail-
consumer-sale-financing, because most of the goods purchased fall
into the classification of consumer goods. Where there is doubt as to
whether particular items are consumer goods or equipment, the
secured party should file a financing statement as a precautionary
measure rather than suffer from a misinterpretation of the nature of
the collateral in later litigation. By so doing he will have assurance
that his rights cannot be subordinated to those of other secured parties
or lien creditors.
Secured Party v. Possessory Lienor
Under the UCC a person who, in the ordinary course of his busi-
ness repairs goods which are subject to a security interest or attaches
his own materials to such goods and under state statutory or common
law is entitled to a possessory lien, is given priority over the security
interest, unless the lien is statutory and expressly provides otherwise.61
Virginia gives statutory recognition to three possessory liens: the
inkeepers lien, 02 the lien of keepers of livery stables and garages, 63
and the lien of mechanics.6 The statutory lien for just and reasonable
charges for the services of a mechanic gives a priority over the rights
of a conditional vendor to -the extent of $5o.odo, 5 but the other two
liens do not expressly give any priority over the conditional vendor.66
IUCC § 9 -3oi(i)(b).
wArbuckle Bros. v. Gates, 95 Va. 802, go S.E. 496 (1898).
OId. at 813.
OUCC § 9-310.
cVa. Code Ann. § 43-31 (Rep. Vol. 1953).
"Va. Code Ann. § 43-32 (Repl. Vol. 1953).
"Va. Code Ann. § 43-33 (Supp. 1962).
eo-Ibid.
O'See supra notes 6. and 63.
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Since none of the statutes expressly provides otherwise, it appears
that the $50.00 clause in the mechanics' lien statute is rendered
nugatory under the UCC and in all three instances the possessory lien
takes priority over the perfected security interest.
Secured Creditor v. Owner and Purchaser of Real Property
as Regards Fixtures
In Virginia, as has been noted, goods which are attached to realty,
yet are removable, are subject to the provisions of the conditional
sales statutes.67 Under the UCC, a purchase money security interest
in goods is fully protected if it attaches and is perfected before the
goods become fixtures.0 8 Such a security interest as that which a mer-
chant holds in a washing machine or in a furnace in a consumer's
home, which has been perfected without filing, presents some possible
problems. This provision which allows the secured party to prevail
over the buyer of the home, may appear harsh, for the buyer would
have no way of knowing the goods were subject to a "perfected se-
curity interest." Further, the provision of the UCC which gives the
bona fide purchaser of goods priority over the secured party who has
not protected his interest in consumer goods by the filing of a financ-
ing statement, does not apply if the consumer goods are fixtures. 69
However, the UCC further provides that whether goods become fix-
tures is a question of state law, 0 not covered by the UCC. A liberal
approach as to whether the goods become fixtures has been followed
in Virginia indicating that the washing machine and furnace are not
fixtures, but remain consumer goods or equipment. Hence, a security
interest perfected without filing in these consumer goods is defeated
by the bona fide purchaser of such consumer goods from the debtor.
There have been several Virginia cases holding that such items as a
boiler in a plant,71 a sprinkler systemr7 2 and other machinery bolted
down in the plant or even imbedded in concrete, are not necessarily
fixtures. Whether an item of collateral is said to be a fixture depends
on the intent of the parties.73 The United State Supreme Court in
considering the status of a sprinkling system installed in a factory,
interpreted Virginia law on the fixture provision as follows:
OSee supra, notes 5 and 6.
"'UCC § 9"313(2)-
rUCC § 9-3o7(2).
'OUCC § 9-307(2); UCc § 9-313(1).
'Monarch Laundry v. Westbrook, aog Va. 382, 63 S.E. 1070 (1909).
' 2Holt v. Henley, 232 U.S. 637 (1914).
73Ibid.
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"The system was attached to the freehold, but it could be re-
moved without any serious harm for which complaint could be
made ...., other than the loss of the equipment itself. Re-
moval would not affect the integrity of the structure on which
the mortgagees advanced. To hold that the mere fact of an-
nexing the system to the freehold overrode the agreement that
it should remain personalty and still belong to [the vendor]
would be to give a mystic importance to attachment by bolts
and screws.... The case is not like those in which the addition
was in its nature an essential, indispensible part of the com-
pleted structure contemplated by the mortgage. The system al-
though useful and valuable can be removed and the work still
go on."
74
If the secured seller has filed a financing statement to protect the
security interest in the consumer goods placed in the home, he will
of course prevail over the rights of the buyer of the home. This is
proper and in accord with the previous discussion of the rights of the
seller as against those of a bona fide purchaser of goods.
If the secured party does have priority, on default by the debtor
he is entitled to remove his collateral from the real estate. However,
he must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the real estate, who
is not his debtor, and who has not otherwise agreed, for the cost of
repair of any physical injury. The secured party is not liable for
any subsequent diminution in the value of the real estate which
might be caused by the removal of the goods. The parties entitled to
reimbursement may require the secured party to give adequate security
for performance before allowing the removal of the goods.1 5
THE FILING OF A PURCHASE MONEY SECURITY INTEREST UNDER THE
UCC AS COMPARED WITH THE RECORDATION OF A CONDITIONAL SALE
UNDER VIRGINIA LAW
The "filing of a financing statement" is not necessary to perfect a
security interest that has attached to consumer goods, but it is necessary
to perfect an interest in equipment. The ordinary retail seller will not
ordinarily be concerned with filing. His security interest is good at the
time it attaches as against the debtor and all other parties except a
direct sub-purchaser of the consumer goods from his debtor. However,
if the retail seller does want protection against the possibility of a
resale by his debtor, he must file a financing statement, which under
"Id. at 640-41.
'GUCC § 9-313(5).
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the UCC involves some minor differences from prior Virginia recorda-
tion requirements.
Contents of the Statement Filed
Several Virginia cases have involved the contents of the memoran-
dum or contract admitted to record. These cases indicate that the
Virginia conditional sales statute was designed to protect the vendor,
and if he seeks its protection and constructive notice of his retention
of title, the provisions must be strictly complied with76 The UCC
does not require any acknowledgment of signatures, 77 an earlier
formality78 no longer required by the Virginia statute. The following
are necessary requirements of the contract in Virginia: The contract
must be evidenced by a writing signed by the vendor and vendee,
contain the date of the contract, the amount due, when and how
payable, a brief description of the goods and chattels, and the terms
of the reservation or condition.79 The UCC, like Virginia law, allows
what is in substance a memorandum, the financing statement, to be
filed.8 0 The formal requisites of a financing statement must be com-
plied with if the statement, when filed, is to serve as valid constructive
notice of the perfected security interest. The entire security agree-
ment may be filed but a statement is sufficient as a financing statement
if it is (1) signed by the debtor and the secured party, (2) gives an
address of the secured party from which information concerning the
security interest may be obtained, (3) gives a mailing address of the
debtor and (4) contains a statement indicating the type of collateral or
describing the terms of the arrangement for collateral.8 '
The Virginia statutory requirements have been more exacting.
Virginia case law indicates that the contract must be so complete that
a person can obtain from it information on all the rights which the
7OTokheim Oil Tank & Pump Co. v. Fentress, 33 F.2d 730 (4th Cir. 1929);
Groner v. Babcock Printing Press Mfg. Co., 267 Fed. 822 (4th Cir. 1920); In re
Adkins, 197 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. Va. 1961); Mack Truck Corp. v. Jones, 153 Va.
183, 149 S.E. 544 (1929); Peoples Bank v. Merchants Bank, 152 Va. 520, 147 S.E.
220 (1929); National Cash Register Co. v. Norfolk City Realty Co., 11o Va. 791,
67 S.E. 372 (191o); National Cash Register Co. v. Burrow, iio Va. 785, 67 S.E. 370
(191o); Monarch Laundry v. Westbrook, io9 Va. 382, 63 S.E. 1070 (1909); Callahan
v. Young, go Va. 574, 19 S.E. 163 (1894).
7Va. Code 1919, tit. 46, § 5189, comments.
,"Id.; Callahan v. Young, 90 Va. 574, 19 S.E. 163 (1894).
""Va. Code Ann. § 55-88 (Repl. Vol. 1959); National Cash Register Co. v. Burrow,
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parties intended to create.8 2 Consequently, where the due date is
not certain because of a discretion left in the vendor to set the date,
8 3
or dates are conflicting,8 4 the contract is not effectively recorded.
Where, however, the due dates were listed as thirty, sixty and ninety
days from the date referred to in the contract, this was held suffi-
cient.8 5 The amount due has been held to be certain despite an in-
surance provision which added the premium costs to the conditional
vendee's debt.8 6 The statute requires signature of both seller and
buyer, and so if the seller fails to sign the contract, a recordation is
defective and does not protect the vendor's interest.8 7 The courts have
been very strict in applying the statutory provisions relating to signa-
tures, amount due, due date and method of payment. The courts
have been somewhat more lenient in dealing with the requirement as
to a "brief description," but still unwilling to allow any general
description to suffice.88 The general rule has been that a brief de-
scription of the goods is sufficient to serve as constructive notice to
third parties if the description in the contract is such as will enable
the party examining the instrument to identify the property.8 9 The
UCC provides that "any description of personal property ... is suffi-
cient whether or not it is specific if it reasonably identifies what is
described."' 0 Since the basic requirement for the description in Vir-
ginia and under the UCC is about the same, the many Virginia cases
which have decided what constitutes a sufficient description will con-
tinue to be applicable.
The tenor of the many Virginia cases dealing with the recordation
problems indicate that although there are fewer formal requirements
under the UCC, those that are an integral part of the financing state-
ment will have to be strictly complied with.
1T'ilton v. H. M. Wade Mfg. Co., 2 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1924); In re Fineman,
15o F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Va. 1957); National Cash Register Co. v. Norfolk City Realty
Co., iio Va. 791, 67 S.E. 372 (191o); National Cash Register Co. v. Burrow, xio
Va. 785, 67 S.E. 370 (1910).
3National Cash Register Co. v. Burrow, iio Va. 785, 67 S.E. 370 (1910).
8 Tokheim Oil Tank and Pump Co. v. Fentress, 33 F.-d 730 (4 th Cir. 1929).
5Newcomb v. Gunthrie, 145 Va. 627, 134 S.E. 585 (1926).
t3Fisch v. Steingold, 79 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1935).
6rIn re Adkins, 197 F. Supp. 287 (E.D. Va. i96); Mack Truck Co. v. Jones,
153 Va. 183, 149 S.E. 544 (1929).
8-Tokheim Oil Tank & Pump Co. v. Fentress, 33 Fed.ad 730 (4th Cir. 1929).
'Tilton v. H. M. Wade Mfg. Co., 2 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1924).
90UCC § 9-110.
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PLACE OF FILING
Under the UCC a financing statement to cover consumer goods,
is filed in the county or city of the debtor's residence, or if the debtor
is not a resident of the state, then in the locality where the goods are
kept.91 This represents a departure from Virginia law which requires
recordation in the county or corporation where the chattel itself is
kept.92Tokheim Oil Tank & Pump Co. v. Fentress,93 a federal bank-
ruptcy case, held that a contract recorded in the city, while the goods
were stored in the county, was not validly recorded.
Where the collateral is goods, which are to become fixtures, re-
gardless of how classified the place of filing is where mortgages on real
-property are recorded, 94 which in Virginia is the county or city where
the real estate is located. The UCC provides the three alternatives of
central filing, local filing, and both central and local filing where
the collateral is equipment, with some combinations available de-
pending on the nature of the collateral. 95
A good faith filing, although not done correctly, under the UCC
is good in so far as it is effective as to all collateral covered by the
financing statement. This is so at least as against any person who ac-
tually knows the contents of the improperly filed statement. In essence,
this provision rejects the idea that an improperly filed statement is not
notice even to a person who knows of it.96
PLACE OF FILING WHEN CHATTEL IS MOVED FROM ONE LOCALITY
TO ANOTHER
The Virginia statute provides that when the goods and chattels
covered by the recorded contract are removed to another county, the
original recordation becomes invalid or expires after one year, unless
within the year the contract is duly recorded in the county or corpora-
"The text assumes that Virginia will adopt either alternative two or three of
UCC § 9-4o1i()(a), and continue the Virginia system of local filing. Alternative
one of this subsection provides for central filing. Some amendment of the UCC
seems to be necessary here in order to provide for local filing in a county or city,
in recognition of the peculiar Virginia situation in which the cities are indepen-
dent of the counties, a political arrangement, with which the draftsmen of the
UCC apparently were not familiar.
1 1Va. Code Ann. § 55-88 (Repl. Vol. 1959). See also Va. Code Ann. § 55-1o2
(Repl. Vol. 1959).
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tion to which the goods are removed. 7 There is a saving provision
which affords protection to infants and insane persons until one year
after ,the particular disability is removed.
The UCC provides an alternative provision under which a filing
made in the proper county continues effective for four months after
a change in the location which controlled the original filing.9 8 Adop-
tion of this alternative proposition would cut down the present one
year grace period provided in Virginia. The other alternative offered
by the UCC provides for continued effectiveness of the original filing
even after removal within the state.99
Under the UCC when goods come into the state which have been
subjected to a valid security interest duly recorded in the former state,
the validity of this prior perfected security interest depends on the law
of the state in which it was originally perfected. 1° ° This perfected
security interest continues for four months after removal, but it must
be perfected again in the state where the goods become newly located.
Such perfection results in a continuing perfection. If the four month
requirement is not complied with, the security interest may be per-
fected any time before a third party's rights are affected.
Virginia Code section 55-99 provides that goods subject to an
"encumbrance" which are "removed to the state" are not valid unless
recorded.' 0 ' There is no grace period provided. However, the Vir-
ginia court has indicated that a conditional sale is not an "encum-
brance" within the provisions of section 55-99.102 However, if an auto-
mobile is involved, there are special provisions under the Motor Ve-
hicle Code which treat a conditional sale as an encumbrance.103 It
should be noted, however, that the issue has never been raised as to
whether a security interest in a refrigerator or other item not covered
by the Motor Vehicle Code would be considered as an encumbrance
by the court today. The cases have always involved automobiles. The
adoption of the UCC, of course, resolves that question.
There are some Virginia decisions as to what constitutes removal
to the state.
171a. Code Ann. § 55-98 (Rep1. Vol. 1959).
IIUCC § 9-4o, Alternate subsection (3).
"'UCC § 9-401(3)-
' UCC § 9-401; UCC § 9-103.
'"'Va. Code Ann. § 55-99 (Repl. Vol. 1959).
'wUniversal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Kaplan, 198 Va. 67, 92 S.E..d 359 (1956);
C.I.T. Corp. v. Guy, 170 Va. 16, 195 S.E. 659 (1938); Osmond-Barringer Co. v. Hey,
7 Va. Law Reg. (N.s.) 175 (1921).
'Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Kaplan, 198 Va. 67, 74, 92 S.E.2d 359, 363
(1956).
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"It is, therefore, settled that before recordation is required
under Code, § 55-99, the property brought into Virginia must
come to rest and be located here to the extent of acquiring a
new situs. The acquisition of a new situs signifies something
more than the temporary or transient presence of the property
in this state. It implies some degree of permanency, and unless
this requirement is established, it can not be said that the prop-
erty has been 'removed into' and 'located in,' Virginia as con-
templated by the statute."'
04
Filing is completed under the UCC upon presentation of a financ-
ing statement and tender of the filing fee or acceptance of the state-
ment by the clerk.105 Notice is given when a financing statement is
filed, not indexed, so the secured party does not bear the risk that
the clerk will not properly file the financing statement. This leaves
unchanged Virginia law under which constructive notice is effective
from the time the conditional sales contract is filed for docketing
with the clerk.106
The duration of the validly perfected security interest is subject to
a time limitation not present in Virginia law. The UCC provides that
a financing statement is effective until its stated maturity date, but not
to exceed five years, plus a sixty day grace period 07 However, con-
tinuation statements may be filed which will continue the security
interest for another five-year period. 08
DEFAULT
When the debtor defaults in his payments under the purchase
money security interest, the seller of the goods is entitled to reduce his
claim to judgment or otherwise enforce his security interest by any
available judicial procedure 09 Unless otherwise agreed, he may take
possession of the collateral without judicial process, if this can be done
1o'198 Va. at 72-.
UCC § 9-4o3(1).
'°°Va. Code Ann. § 55-88 (Repi. Vol. 1959).
0'TUCC § 9-406.
"~The UCC provides a permissive device for noting of record any release of
collateral. This is merely permissive and is not a requirement. It is considered to be
a device which will reflect the true state of the record. This provision represents
somewhat of a departure from Virginia law. The Virginia code specifically pro-
vides that every "vendor in a contract for the sale of personal property... shall,
upon payment to him of the amount of the purchase price in full, as set forth in
the contract, cause the same to be marked satisfied upon the margin of the vendee
index and on the line or lines where the name of each vendee appears." See: UCC
§ 9-4o6; Va. Code Ann. § 55-92 (Repl. Vol. 1959).
'°0UCC § 9-501(1).
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without breach of the peace, or he may proceed by legal action." 0 If
the agreement so provides, he may require the debtor to assemble the
collateral in a place selected by the secured party, but convenient to
both of the parties."' If the secured party does not choose to remove
"equipment," he may render the equipment unusable or dispose of it
on the debtor's premises, without removal." 2 However, any such action
must be done in a commercially reasonably manner. The secured
party may sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the goods
or collateral in their present condition, or following any commercially
reasonable preparation or processing." 3 He may sell the goods at
a public or private sale as long as the sale is made in a commercially
reasonable manner. There is no prohibition against the secured
parties' buying the goods at a public sale if the collateral is of a type
customarily sold in a recognized market or is subject to widely known
price quotations." 4 Reasonable notification as to the time and place
of a sale is to be sent to the debtor and, except in the case of consumer
goods, to any person who has a security interest in the goods." 5 A
purchaser at the sale takes free of all other rights and interests even
though the secured party fails to comply fully with the requirements
of a public sale, if he is without knowledge and does not act in col-
lusion with another party or in a private sale if he acts in good faith."16
The seller is entitled to a deficiency judgment if the proceeds of the
sale do not compensate him.
Except for the aforementioned requirement of notification to the
debtor, there is no statutory period during which the collateral must
be held before disposition. It would seem that reasonable notification
would entail such notice as would allow the person to receive it, and
have sufficient time to take appropriate steps to protect his interest by
taking part in the sale. There is, however, a special requirement
where consumer goods are concerned. The UCC does expressly provide
that if the debtor has paid 6o per cent of the purchase price, in the
case of a purchase money security interest in consumer goods, the
seller who has taken possession of the goods must resell, and if he
fails to do so within go days after he has taken possession, he will be







2UCC § 9 -504(4)(a)(b).
ucc § 9-505(0).
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written renunciation of his right to require sale. It should also be
evident that it would not be proper to delay the sale for an excessive
period of time so as to place unreasonable storage charges on the
debtor.
Another remedy open to the secured party is that he may pro-
pose to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debtor's obligation.11s
This may be done, unless the debtor, who must be notified, objects
in writing within thirty days. If the debtor objects, the secured party
must sell and look to the debtor for a deficiency judgment or turn over
any excess to the debtor.
The debtor may choose to pay off his obligation and redeem the
collateral at any time before the seller has disposed of the collateral or
entered into a contract for its disposition. In redeeming the goods he
must, of course, offer to pay the additional expenses which have been
incurred by the secured party. If the secured party has made a partial
sale of the collateral, the debtor by satisfying the remaining obliga-
tion may redeem what is left." 9
If a public or private sale of the goods does in fact take place, the
proceeds are applied in this order: 120 (i) reasonable expenses of retak-
ing holding and preparing the goods for sale and the reasonable attor-
neys' fees and legal expenses incurred by the secured party; (2) com-
plete satisfaction of the debtor's indebtedness and satisfaction of the
indebtness of anyone subordinate to the secured interest. If there is
a surplus, the secured party must account to the debtor for that
amount and the debtor is liable for any deficiency that remains.'
21
Under Virginia law the seller of goods has these remedies. (i)
Under the provisions of a special statute, he can petition a trial justice
and get complete relief. Although the statute was passed to cover
problems arising under the conditional sales statute, it is not the only
remedy available to the seller. (2) He can seek peaceable possession of




""The UCC provides a remedy against a secured party who misuses the
mechanism of Article 9 and does not proceed in good faith. He must proceed to
dispose of goods in a reasonable manner. The fact that at another time he might
have gotten a better price for the collateral sold does not indicate lack of good
faith. If he fails to give proper notice of sale, he is liable to parties harmed by his
noncompliance, and if the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor has a right to
recover not less than the credit service charge or time price differential plus io%
of the cash price or principal amount of the debt. UCC § 507().
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public sale. (3) He may institute an action at law for the unpaid pur-
chase price. (4) He may bring an action of detinue122
Under the provisions of section 55-93 of the Virginia Code, re-
possession and sale by the seller without legal process constitutes
cancellation and full satisfaction of the amount of the security
covered by the contract.123 This is the law despite any contrary pro-
visions written into the contract. It was recently held in Virginia that
the fact that an auctioneer at a public sale was not licensed did not
change the essential character of the sale, which was in fact a public
sale.
2 4
For several years, Virginia has had a statute which gave a de-
faulting vendee a choice when confronted with an action of detinue.125
He could choose to pay the judgment or return the property, in
which case, the act of returning the property cancelled the debt.
However, in recent years, the legislature passed another statute giv-
ing a detinue action.12 6 There appears to be some conflict between
the statutes and possibly the option on the part of the vendee no
longer exists. 127 However, if the seller does proceed under section
55-94 and does recover the goods, he is not entitled to a deficiency
judgment. It is felt that the vendor cannot recover both the prop-
erty and a deficiency judgment. The problems created by these two
statutes have not yet been resolved.
If a conditional vendor does seize collateral and sells it at a public
sale, he is entitled to the expenses involved in the sale, in addition
to the satisfaction of the obligation, but he is not permitted to make
a profit on the sale. 28
The Virginia cases and statutes do not indicate that any real prob-
lems will be created by the UCC. The Virginia conditional sales
statute and its remedies, though criticized, have proved workable
and useful. The UCC seems to follow the better aspects of Virginia
conditional sales law and supplements it with some modern business
experiences and techniques, namely the perfection of a security in-
terest in consumer goods without record.
'22Va. Code Ann. § 8-593 (Repl. Vol. 1957); Lloyd v. Federal Motor Truck
Co., 168 Va. 72, 19o S.E. 257 (1937).
'Va. Code Ann. Sec. 55-93 (Repl. Vol. 1959).
"'Associates Discount Corp. v. Lunsford, 204 Va. 1, 128 S.E.2d (1963).
'-Va. Code § 8-593 (Repl. Vol. 1957). See: Lloyd v. Federal Motor Truck Co.
168 Va. 72, 19o S.E. 257 (1937); Ashworth v. Fleenor, 178 Va. 1o4, 16 S.E.2d 3o9
(1941).
""Va. Code Ann. § 55-94 (Repl. Vol. 1959).
'-See Snead, Retail Installment Sales v. Virginia Remedies on Default, 16 Wash.
Lee L. Rev. 1 (1959).
InLynchburg Motor Co. v. Thomasson, 141 Va. 153, 126 S.E. 64 (1924).
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